Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
The Products Liability Restatement: Was it a
Success?

Article 20

2009

An Opportunity for Reform: Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy
and NCAA Recruiting
Jon Perrelle

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Jon Perrelle, An Opportunity for Reform: Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy and NCAA Recruiting, 74
Brook. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol74/iss3/20

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

An Opportunity for Reform
TENNESSEE SECONDARY SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
V. BRENTWOOD ACADEMY AND NCAA RECRUITING
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004, news broke that the Colorado University football
program had used sex, drugs, and alcohol to lure recruits to the school.1
An investigative panel reviewing the incidents issued a fifty-page report,
in which it found that player-hosts “felt pressured to impress recruits and
resorted to providing alcohol, drugs and sex, including visits to strip
clubs and the hiring of strippers.”2 While the nation’s colleges and
universities and their coaches condemned Colorado’s practices,3
regrettably, the truth is that Colorado University was neither the first nor
the last school to engage in such scandalous recruiting.4 In fact, evidence
suggests that the occurrence of these practices is increasing.5
Unfortunately, these improper recruiting practices are a product
of the current state of intercollegiate athletics. According to colleges and
1

Steven K. Paulson, Panel Probing Colorado Issues Blistering Report, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 19, 2004, at D14.
2
Id. According to the report, there was no evidence that officials condoned the
misconduct; however, it did suggest that they were “lazy, ineffective or simply ignored what was
going on . . . .” Id.
3
See Greg Wallace, Winds of Change: College Recruiting Set to Get Major Overhaul,
BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, May 24, 2004, at 8 (discussing how the Colorado incident and another
recruiting scandal at the University of Miami would lead to changes in NCAA recruiting rules and
predicting that such changes would be welcomed by many coaches).
4
See, e.g., Brad Wolverton, NCAA Says Athletics Infractions Cases Will Reach a
Record High This Year, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Sept. 19, 2007, available at
http://chronicle.com/daily/2007/09/2007091904n.htm. The history of collegiate recruiting illustrates
that no matter what occurs, college coaches have continued to engage in illegal and ethically
questionable recruiting tactics. See Andy Staples, A History of Recruiting; How Coaches Have
Stayed a Step Ahead, SI.COM, June 23, 2008, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/
06/19/recruiting.main/index.html?eref=T.
5
See Wolverton, supra note 4. According to Wolverton, the NCAA’s enforcement staff
was on pace to complete twenty major infraction cases in 2007, a third more than 2006, and twice
the number it handled in 2002. Id. In addition, athletic departments reported about 3500 minor rules
violations for 2006, about fifty percent more than in 2002. Id.; see also Daniel F. Mahoney et al.,
Ethics in Intercollegiate Athletics: An Examination of NCAA Violations and Penalties—1952-1997,
in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 447, 449 (Scott R. Rosner & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 2004)
(providing data that shows the number of men’s programs penalized has risen from 7.1 per year in
the 1950s to 18.5 in the 1990s).
Notably, David Price, the NCAA’s vice president for enforcement, suggests that the
rise in violations may be the result of the NCAA’s commitment to speedier investigations and
colleges’ devotion to greater compliance with the rules. Wolverton, supra note 4. For more on
NCAA enforcement, see infra Part III.C.3.
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universities, the purpose of college athletics is to enhance the educational
experience of the student.6 To preserve this end, many of America’s
schools have joined the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”), an independent body charged with governing intercollegiate
athletics.7 Consistent with the goals of its member institutions, the
NCAA claims that college athletics is an avocation: a recreational
activity meant to ensure that “the educational experience of the studentathlete is paramount.”8 Yet, despite this profession, college athletics has
become much more than an avocation, as colleges and universities have
become focused on achieving athletic prowess, even at the expense of
academic excellence.9
Consumed by a need to achieve athletic success, many coaches
resort to questionable recruiting tactics.10 To prevent such measures, the
NCAA has adopted an extensive set of rules governing the recruitment of
student-athletes.11 Nonetheless, despite the NCAA’s efforts, coaches still
continue to commit recruiting violations, and, perhaps even worse,
engage in questionable conduct that is not proscribed by the recruiting
rules.12 This persistent usurpation of both NCAA and ethical standards
indicates that NCAA recruiting rules need to be drastically changed.13

6

See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT DIVISION OF ATHLETICS, 2007-08 STUDENTATHLETE HANDBOOK 3 (2007), available at http://www.uconnhuskies.com/MainLinks/AboutUconn/
0708%20SA%20Handbook%20revised.pdf.
7
The NCAA is not the only governing body of college athletics—other prominent
collegiate athletic associations include, for example, the National Association of Intercollegiate
Athletics (“NAIA”) and the National Junior College Athletic Association (“NJCAA”)—but it is the
largest and most prominent regulator of college athletics and thus will be the focus of this Note.
8
NCAA, Our Mission, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1352 (last visited
Jan. 3, 2009).
9
See discussion infra Parts III.B.3, III.C.3.
10
See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
11
See, e.g., NCAA, 2008-09 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 77-125 (2008) [hereinafter
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/ProductsDetailView.aspx?
sku=D109. The NCAA has manuals that set forth the rules governing all three divisions of
intercollegiate athletics. See NCAA, Rules and Bylaws, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=19
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
12
According to David Price, because of the recent rule changes and the emphasis on
compliance, recruiting tactics have become “increasingly creative.” Wolverton, supra note 4.
Throughout history, coaches have been one step ahead of the NCAA. See Staples, supra note 4
(quoting Conference USA Commissioner Britton Banowsky as saying that “[e]very time [the
NCAA] change[s] the rules, somebody comes up with something”). After the NCAA passes a rule,
coaches will find some creative way to get around it, after which the NCAA will pass a new rule
banning the conduct, and the cycle will repeat itself. See id. (providing a history of coaches skirting
NCAA recruiting rules); Dana O’Neil, Gray Scale: Recruiters Struggle with Perfectly Legal Yet
Ethically Questionable, ESPN.COM, Nov. 19, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?id=
3710807&lpos=spotlight&lid=tab4pos1 (discussing ways in which recruiting rules are now being
circumvented, in violation of the intent of the rule, as well as flat-out broken).
A good example of this is shown by the fact that, after the NCAA banned sending text
messages to recruits, coaches began using different practices to get around the ban. Andy Staples,
Beating the System: With Texting Outlawed, Coaches Turn to E-mail; Notes, SI.COM, Jan, 14, 2008
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/01/14/recruiting.notebook/index.html.
One method is to e-mail recruits—currently, the NCAA allows unlimited emailing—since, for
recruits able to receive e-mail on their phones, an e-mail to them is essentially the same as a text
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Fortunately, a recent decision by the Supreme Court in
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy
(“Brentwood II”),14 can be the catalyst for such a change.15 In Brentwood
II, the Supreme Court upheld a high school athletic association’s AntiRecruiting Rule against a First Amendment challenge by one of its
member schools.16 The Rule effectively prevented recruiting by
prohibiting a school from using undue influence on a student in order to
retain his admission for athletic purposes.17 In upholding the Rule, the
Court applied its public employee speech doctrine because of Brentwood
Academy’s voluntary decision to join the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association (“TSSAA”).18
This Note focuses on the Brentwood II decision and the potential
implications it will have on NCAA recruiting. Specifically, it argues that
the NCAA is entitled to the same broad authority to limit recruiting as
the Supreme Court gave to the TSSAA. Ultimately, while an
intercollegiate athletic association and high school athletic association
are certainly different, given the reasoning of the Court in Brentwood II
and other cases, this Note claims that the Court would, in the context of
recruiting, treat the NCAA no differently than the TSSAA, and thus
would permit the NCAA to effectively ban the athletic recruitment of
high school student-athletes.
Part II begins by discussing the relevant background of the
Brentwood II case. It then sets forth the development and parameters of
the public employee speech doctrine, and how it was applied in
Brentwood II. Part III then analyzes the implications Brentwood II could
have on the NCAA. After briefly looking at the background of the
NCAA, Part III examines whether the Court would be inclined to apply
the public employee speech doctrine to collegiate recruiting. It then
addresses what the likely result would be, under current public employee
speech law, if the NCAA were to pass a recruiting ban similar to the

message. Id. Another method coaches have used is to have one of his or her players text message a
recruit. Id.
13
The NCAA Rule Book only contributes to the current state of recruiting. The 439
page-long book, with forty-nine pages devoted to recruiting alone, not only makes it difficult for
coaches to understand all the rules, but also leaves a lot of room for interpretation. See O’Neil, supra
note 12; NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at 77-125.
14
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
2489 (2007).
15
See David G. Savage & Eric Sondheimer, Justices Uphold High School AntiRecruiting Rule, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 22, 2007, at 13 (quoting Elsa Kircher Cole, general counsel for the
NCAA, as saying “[t]his will have an impact on all athletic associations, at whatever level, to make
and enforce rules like this one involving recruiting”).
16
Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2490-91.
17
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 673
(M.D. Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), on remand, 262
F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001).
18
Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
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TSSAA’s.19 Finally, Part IV briefly discusses why the NCAA should
establish a recruiting ban and how such a ban could be implemented.
II.

BRENTWOOD II

A.

Facts

The TSSAA is a private, voluntary association of public,
independent, and parochial secondary schools from the state of
Tennessee.20 Its purpose is “to stimulate and regulate the athletic relations
of the secondary schools in Tennessee.”21 One of the TSSAA’s members
is Brentwood Academy, an independent college-preparatory school
located in Brentwood, Tennessee.22
In order to prevent member schools from recruiting middle
school student-athletes for their athletic programs, the TSSAA has
promulgated an Anti-Recruiting Rule.23 The Anti-Recruiting Rule,
located in TSSAA Bylaws Section 21 reads:
The use of undue influence on a student (with or without an athletic record), his
or her parents or guardians of a student by any person connected, or not
connected, with the school to secure or to retain a student for athletic purposes
shall be a violation of the recruiting rule.24

The circumstances of the case arose in 1997, when Brentwood
Academy’s head football coach, Carlton Flatt, sent a letter to middle
school students, inviting them to participate in spring football practice.25
The letter explained that “getting involved as soon as possible would
definitely be to your advantage,” and was signed, “Your Coach.”26
Although the boys who received the letter had already agreed to attend
Brentwood Academy in the fall, they had not yet enrolled in the school
as defined by the TSSAA.27 As a result, the TSSAA found that Coach
19

This Note suggests implementing an NCAA recruiting ban that is similar to the
TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule, which prevents coaches from asserting undue pressure on a student
and his or her parents or guardians to retain the student’s services for athletic purposes. Brentwood,
13 F. Supp. 2d at 673. This hypothetical “NCAA recruiting ban,” referred to throughout this Note,
would prevent a coach from influencing a student-athlete to attend his school for the purposes of
athletics. It would not prevent unilateral activity by the student-athlete, such as sending video of
themselves to coaches, in order to bolster his chance for admission. See infra Part IV.
20
Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 442 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir.
2006), rev’d, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
2489 (2007).
24
Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
25
Id. at 676. Coach Flatt also called the students to tell them that “they should not
participate in spring practice if it conflicted with activities at their respective middle schools.” Id.
26
Id.
27
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
2489, 2492 (2007) (The TSSAA defines enrolled as having “attended 3 days of school.”).
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Flatt’s letter violated its Anti-Recruiting Rule and imposed sanctions on
Brentwood Academy.28
On December 12, 1997, Brentwood Academy filed an action
against the TSSAA in the U.S. District Court, Middle District of
Tennessee, to contest the penalties.29 Brentwood brought suit under
§ 1983,30 alleging that the Anti-Recruiting Rule violated its First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.31 After concluding that the
TSSAA was a state actor subject to suit under § 1983, the district court
agreed with Brentwood, holding that the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule
violated the First Amendment.32 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that
the TSSAA was not a state actor and thus not subject to § 1983 liability.33
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court on the threshold
issue, concluding that the TSSAA was indeed a state actor, and
remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit for adjudication on the
merits of Brentwood’s claims.34 After both the district court and court of
appeals held that the Anti-Recruiting Rule violated Brentwood’s free
speech rights,35 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
Brentwood’s First Amendment claim.36 In addressing the
constitutionality of the Anti-Recruiting Rule, the Court applied a line of

28

Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 676-77. The TSSAA also found that Brentwood coaches
had violated the Anti-Recruiting Rule for: (1) admitting student-athletes to athletic contests free of
charge, and (2) conducting impermissible off-season practice with Brentwood student-athletes. Id.
However, for the purposes of Brentwood’s First Amendment claim, the only violation at issue was
the one regarding Coach Flatt’s letter.
29
Id. at 678. The dispute between Brentwood and the TSSAA has been quite lengthy.
Since Brentwood Academy filed its action, the case has produced two decisions by the Supreme
Court, three by the Sixth Circuit, and two by the Middle District of Tennessee. Brentwood, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 670 (M.D. Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rehearing en banc denied,
190 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), on
remand, 262 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002), on remand, 304 F. Supp.
2d 981 (M.D. Tenn. 2003), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, and remanded, 442 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2006),
rehearing en banc denied, cert. granted, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad.,
127 S. Ct. 852 (2007), rev’d and remanded, 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007).
30
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 permits a cause of action against any person
who, when acting under color of law, deprives another of any Constitutional Rights. Id. This, of
course, includes the right to freedom of speech. See U.S. CONST. amend I.
31
Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 678. Brentwood also alleged (1) that the TSSAA
violated its Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights, (2) that the
TSSAA violated federal antitrust laws, (3) equitable estoppel, and (4) unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary,
and oppressive action in violation of state law. Id. at 672.
32
Id. at 694.
33
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir.
1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
34
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n (Brentwood I), 531 U.S.
288, 290-91, 305 (2001).
35
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 304 F. Supp. 2d 981, 997
(M.D. Tenn. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 442 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2006), rev’d
and remanded, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007);
Brentwood, 442 F.3d at 430-31.
36
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
852 (2007).
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cases traditionally reserved for determining the free speech rights of
public employees.37
B.

Speech Rights in Public Employment

While the First Amendment protects the right to engage in free
speech without government interference,38 it is well settled that this right
is not absolute.39 Throughout its history, one area in which the Court has
consistently allowed government interference with free speech rights has
been public employment.40 Before the 1950s, courts gave public
employees no First Amendment protection, allowing public employers to
restrict their employees’ speech without repercussions.41 During this
time, most courts adopted the view of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who
concluded in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford42 that, because there
was no constitutional right to public employment, there was no right to
freedom of speech in public employment.43
By the mid-twentieth century, however, courts’ refusal to
recognize public employee speech rights began to erode. Beginning in
the 1950s the Supreme Court began recognizing that some limited First
Amendment protection extended to public employment.44 Eventually, in
1968, the Court finally rejected the reasoning in McAuliffe, officially
recognizing in Pickering v. Board of Education that public employees
have certain free speech rights in the workplace.45

37

Id. at 2495. The line of cases that sets the standard for the restriction of speech in
public employment begins with Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See
discussion infra Part II.B. Prior to the decision in Brentwood II, Pickering applied only to the speech
rights of government employees and contractors, not to speech by an employee at a private school
that is a member of a private athletic association. Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2499 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
38
U.S. CONST. amend I. Although the Constitution only protects the right of free speech
from congressional interference, the Supreme Court has since held that the right to freedom of
speech is a fundamental right protected against the states by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
39
Chapinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”).
40
See Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1464-67 (2007).
41
Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech:
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (And Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 945-46 (2001).
42
29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
43
Id. at 518. Holmes’ oft-cited opinion was that “The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” Id. at 517.
44
See Lara Geer Farley, Comment, A Matter of Public Concern: “Official Duties” of
Employment Gag Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 603, 610 (2007) (citing
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)). In Wieman, the Court found unconstitutional an
Oklahoma statute that required all public employees to take a loyalty oath, holding that
“constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory.” Wieman, 344 U.S. at 186, 192.
45
See Wells, supra note 41, at 946.
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The decision in Pickering has remained the law regarding public
employee speech rights for the past forty years without much alteration.46
However, the Court has added two important threshold requirements.
These requirements are set forth in Connick v. Myers47 and Garcetti v.
Ceballos.48 Together, these three cases have established a three-pronged
test that is used when determining the free speech rights of public
employees.49
1. Pickering v. Board of Education
The landmark public employee speech case began when Marvin
Pickering, a high school teacher in Will County, Illinois, wrote a letter to
a local newspaper criticizing the local school board.50 The letter attacked
the school’s handling of a bond proposal as well as the subsequent
allocation of the financial resources it received from the proposal.51 In
response to this letter, the school board dismissed Pickering.52 After his
dismissal, Pickering challenged the board’s decision, alleging that his
speech was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.53 The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pickering and, in the process,
established a balancing test that delineated the contours of public
employee free speech rights.54
In setting forth the standard for protecting public employee
speech, the Court acknowledged the unique situation public employment
presented. Specifically, it noted that although a public employee has no
constitutional right to employment, once employed, a public employee
may not be subject to arbitrary and unreasonable conditions of
employment.55 Thus, the problem before the Court was determining the
extent of a public employee’s free speech rights in the context of these
conflicting tenets. As its solution, the Court adopted a balancing test that
weighs the interests of a public employee, “as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern against the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of its public services . . . .”56
Applying this test, the Court concluded that since Pickering’s statements
neither interfered with his duties nor disrupted the regular operation of
46

See Estlund, supra note 40, at 1466 (stating that Pickering “has been refined but has
not varied much over the years”).
47
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
48
126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
49
Hereinafter, the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti decisions will be referred to as the
Pickering doctrine.
50
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564-66 (1968).
51
Id. at 565-66.
52
Id. at 566.
53
Id. at 564-65.
54
Id. at 574-75
55
Id. at 568.
56
Id. This test will be referred to as the Pickering balancing test.
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the schools, the school had no interest in limiting Pickering’s speech.57
Consequently, its dismissal of Pickering violated his First Amendment
rights.58
2. Connick v. Myers
After the Court’s decision in Pickering, the public employee
speech doctrine remained mostly unchanged until the Court added a
threshold requirement in 1983.59 In Connick v. Myers, Sheila Myers, an
Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, was fired after she engaged
in speech at her workplace.60 Myers, who was upset that she was being
transferred to another criminal court, prepared and distributed a
questionnaire that was meant to solicit the views of fifteen assistant
district attorneys on various issues, including “the office transfer policy,
office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of
confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work
in political campaigns.”61 After one assistant district attorney reported
that Myers was creating a “mini-insurrection” within the office, her
supervisor, Harry Connick, fired her for her refusal to accept the
transfer.62
Myers challenged her termination, alleging that it was a violation
of her free speech rights as set forth in Pickering.63 However, before
addressing whether Myers’ discharge was protected under the Pickering
balancing test, the Court held that it must first determine whether Myers’
questionnaire constituted “speech on a matter of public concern.”64 In so
holding, the Court established a threshold requirement to the public
employee speech doctrine.
The Court reasoned that this threshold requirement is necessary
because an employer should be granted broad discretion to manage its
employees when their speech does not relate to the concerns of the
community.65 According to the Court, “when a public employee speaks
not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an
employee upon matters only of personal interest,” the employer, except
under the most unusual circumstances, is entitled to take action against
the employee.66 Whether speech “addresses a matter of public concern” is

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 574-75.
See Estlund, supra note 40, at 1466-67.
461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 147.
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determined by the “content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.”67
Looking at the content, form, and context of Myers’
questionnaire, the Court concluded that only one of the questions
survived this threshold test: whether assistant district attorneys “ever feel
pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported
candidates.”68 According to the Court, the questions pertaining to the
office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee,
and the level of confidence in supervisors were “mere extensions” of
Myers’ personal grievance.69 Ultimately, the Court found that these
questions were aimed to give Myers ammunition against her superiors,
and not to evaluate the performance of a public office.70 Such questions
convey nothing except that one employee is upset with the status quo.71
The Court did apply the Pickering balancing test to the one
question that did address a matter of public concern—whether assistant
district attorneys “ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on
behalf of office supported candidates.”72 Nonetheless, the Court found
the speech was unprotected, and Myers’ discharge was not prevented by
the First Amendment, because it touched upon a matter of public concern
in only the most limited sense and her supervisor could reasonably
believe the speech would disrupt the workplace.73
3. Garcetti v. Ceballos
The Connick and Pickering decisions established a two-tiered
test to public employee speech cases.74 The Court first asks whether “the
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”75 If the
answer is yes, the Court then asks whether the employer had an
“adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any
other member of the general public.”76 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court
established a second threshold requirement for public employee speech
cases.77
67

Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 149 (quoting questionnaire created by New Orleans Assistant District Attorney)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Id. at 148.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 149 (quoting questionnaire created by New Orleans Assistant District Attorney)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
73
Id. at 154.
74
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006).
75
Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
76
Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). To answer this
question, the Court used the Pickering balancing test.
77
See Ralph D. Mawdsley & Allan Osborne, The Supreme Court Provides New
Direction for Employee Free Speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 214 ED. LAW REP. 457, 459 (“[T]he
Supreme Court has injected a new interpretive clarification as to when employee’s speech is
68
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Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney for the Los
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.78 In 2000, a defense attorney
asked Ceballos to review an affidavit used in a search warrant.79 Ceballos
reviewed the affidavit and found many inaccuracies.80 After
communicating these inaccuracies to his supervisors, Ceballos claimed
he was subjected to numerous retaliatory employment actions, for which
he brought suit.81
In denying Ceballos’ claim, the Court stressed that the
“controlling factor” in the case was the fact that Ceballos’ expression
was made pursuant to his official duties as a calendar deputy and not as a
citizen.82 According to the Court, when public employees speak
“pursuant to their official duties, [they] are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes,” and thus are not protected by the
Constitution.83 Because Ceballos was speaking pursuant to his official
duties, the Court dismissed Ceballos’ claim without determining whether
his speech addressed a matter of public concern or satisfied the Pickering
balancing test. Consequently, the Court established a third prong in the
test for determining whether a public employee’s speech is
constitutionally protected.84
Despite the addition of the two threshold requirements, the
public employee speech doctrine has not been changed substantially.
Moreover, all indications showed that this doctrine was limited to
protecting the speech of public employees or independent contractors.85
Nevertheless, in Brentwood II, the Court extended the Pickering doctrine
beyond public employment and independent contracting to determine
whether a high school athletic association could limit the recruiting
speech of its private member institutions.
C.

The Decision in Brentwood II

The issue before the Court in Brentwood II was whether the
TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule, which essentially prohibits the athletic
recruitment of middle school student-athletes, violated Brentwood
Academy’s free speech rights. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme

protected as that of a citizen.”); Farley, supra note 44, at 613-14 (stating that Garcetti v. Ceballos
“add[ed] another test to its public employee speech analysis”).
78
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1956.
82
Id. at 1959-60. Neither party in the case disputed that Ceballos “wrote the memo
pursuant to his . . . duties.” Id. at 1961.
83
Id. at 1960.
84
Id. at 1959-62.
85
See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S.
Ct. 2489, 2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, and held that the Anti-Recruiting Rule
did not violate the First Amendment.86
Eight members of the Court agreed with Justice Stevens’
application of the Pickering line of cases to uphold the Anti-Recruiting
Rule.87 Although there was little support for the extension of the
Pickering doctrine to a situation involving a private school in a private
athletic association,88 the Court found that applying Pickering was
appropriate here because Brentwood Academy voluntarily joined the
TSSAA.89 The Court found this situation similar to the public
employment context, noting that the TSSAA’s interest in enforcing its
rules can sometimes warrant curtailing the speech of a member
institution,90 “[j]ust as the government’s interest in running an effective
workplace can in some circumstances outweigh employee speech
rights . . . .”91
Applying the three-part Pickering doctrine, the Court did not
analyze the two threshold questions, choosing instead to assume that
Coach Flatt was speaking as a citizen about a matter of public concern.92
Rather, the Court focused solely on the third prong: the Pickering
balancing test. Rephrasing the balancing test in terms of the facts of the
case, the Court stated that the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule would be
upheld only if it was “necessary to managing an efficient and effective
state-sponsored high school athletic league.”93
86

Id. at 2493 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2495-96. It should be noted that, in addition to finding the Anti-Recruiting Rule
constitutional under Pickering, Justice Stevens found an alternative justification for upholding the
Anti-Recruiting Rule. Id. at 2495. In Part II.A of his opinion, Justice Stevens held the TSSAA’s
Anti-Recruiting Rule constitutional under Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978)—
which held that direct solicitation by a lawyer that exerts undue pressure on clients could be
prohibited—because recruiting, which exerts undue influence on a child, could prevent informed and
reliable decision-making. Id. However, only three other Justices agreed with Stevens; a majority of
Justices refused to extend Ohralik beyond the parameters of that case—i.e., the attorney-client
relationship. Id. at 2498 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because this additional part of Stevens’ analysis
was rejected by a majority of the Court, this Note will not address it.
88
See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 442 F.3d 410,
421-23 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Pickering line of cases did not apply to the instant situation),
rev’d, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007); Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 304 F. Supp. 2d 981 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (no mention
of Pickering line in decision), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 442 F.3d 410 (6th Cir.
2006), rev’d and remanded, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct.
2489 (2007).
89
Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2495-96. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
exemplifies the importance that Brentwood’s voluntary participation in the TSSAA had in the
Court’s decision. According to Kennedy, absent Brentwood’s consensual participation in the
TSSAA, the speech by Coach Flatt would be entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 2498-99
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
90
Id. at 2495 (majority opinion) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984)).
91
Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
92
Id.
93
Id.
87
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Analyzing the purpose of the Anti-Recruiting Rule, the Court
found that it was indeed necessary for the TSSAA to operate efficiently
and effectively.94 The TSSAA established the Rule because athletic
recruiting of middle school students could “lead to exploitation [of
student-athletes], distort competition between high school teams, and
foster an environment in which athletics are [sic] prized more highly than
academics.”95 According to the Court, any one of these harms would
inhibit a high school athletic association’s ability to operate “efficiently
and effectively.”96 Therefore, since the Anti-Recruiting Rule discouraged
the conduct—recruiting—that might lead to these harms, the Court held
that the Rule did not violate Brentwood’s free speech rights.97
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NCAA RECRUITING

In Brentwood II, the Court granted broad discretion to a high
school athletic association to limit the recruitment of student-athletes.98
However, given the reasoning of the decision, Brentwood II could
potentially have a drastic effect on college recruiting. Although it
governs college, and not high school, athletics, the NCAA is very similar
to the TSSAA in its composition, purpose, and values.99 Moreover, the
difference between the NCAA and the TSSAA is minimal in terms of
athletic recruiting. Thus, the likely effect of the Court’s decision in
94

Id.
Id. at 2495-96 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973)).
96
Id. at 2496 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006)).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See discussion supra Part II (TSSAA) and discussion infra Part III.A (NCAA). The
glaring difference between the two is that the NCAA governs the athletics of colleges and
universities throughout the country, as opposed to the athletics of high schools within a state. For the
Supreme Court, this distinction has proved crucial in the context of state action. In Brentwood I, the
Court held that the TSSAA was a state actor that was subject to suit under § 1983. Brentwood Acad.
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n (Brentwood I), 531 U.S. 288, 305 (2001). Contrarily, the
Court has held that the NCAA is not a state actor, and thus cannot be sued under § 1983. NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988). Accordingly, the NCAA could restrict all speech, making the
issue as to whether the Pickering doctrine applies moot.
However, since the decision in Brentwood I, some commentators have argued that
under the Court’s reasoning in Brentwood I, the NCAA may now be considered a state actor. See,
e.g., Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the
application of the majority’s entwinement test could easily change the result of Tarkanian); James
Potter, Note, The NCAA as State Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and Due Process, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1269, 1303 (2007); Robin Petronella, Comment, A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Machiavellian
Approach to Government Action and the Implications of its Recent Decision in Brentwood Academy
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 31 STETSON L. REV. 1057, 1082-83 (2002).
Furthermore, even if the NCAA is not a state actor, its rules can be subjected to § 1983 liability if
they are adopted by a college or university that is a state actor. See Howard M. Wasserman, Fans,
Free Expression, and the Wide World of Sports, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 525, 540 (2006) (stating that
NCAA rules become subject to the First Amendment when a public university adopts them as their
own). Thus, an NCAA recruiting ban could easily come under the scope of the First Amendment
and, as such, this Note will work under the assumption that an NCAA recruiting ban would be
subject to § 1983 liability, knowing that, if the NCAA and its member institutions are not state
actors, recruiting speech could still be restricted.
95
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Brentwood II is that, like the TSSAA, the NCAA could, if it so desired,
prohibit the recruitment of student-athletes.
A.

Background of the NCAA

The NCAA is a private, voluntary organization that governs
intercollegiate athletics among many of America’s colleges and
universities.100 It is comprised of over 1,200 schools,101 which appoint
volunteer representatives who introduce and vote on bylaws and
establish programs to govern, promote, and further the purposes and
goals of intercollegiate athletics.102
The stated purpose of the NCAA is to “govern competition in a
fair, safe, equitable and sportsmanlike manner, and to integrate
intercollegiate athletics into higher education so that the educational
experience of the student-athlete is paramount.”103 Among the NCAA’s
core values are its commitment to:
The collegiate model of athletics in which students participate as an avocation,
balancing their academic, social and athletics experiences . . . . The highest
levels of integrity and sportsmanship . . . . The supporting role that
intercollegiate athletics plays in the higher education mission and in enhancing
the sense of community and strengthening the identity of member
institutions . . . .104

To abide by these core values, the NCAA has instituted
regulations that govern its member institutions in areas such as
amateurism, ethical conduct, eligibility, and recruiting.105 The NCAA
recruiting rules clearly reflect the stated core values. According to The
Principle Governing Recruiting, “Recruiting regulations shall . . . shield
[prospective student athletes] from undue pressures that may interfere
with the scholastic or athletics interests of the prospective studentathletes or their educational institutions.”106
The composition, purpose, and values of the NCAA are
undoubtedly similar to the TSSAA, an organization that is also
composed of voluntary member institutions and strives to create a level
100

NCAA, About the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=2 (last visited

Jan. 3, 2009).
101

NCAA, Composition and Sport Sponsorship of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
ncaa?ContentID=811 (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
102
NCAA, Overview, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=435 (last visited Jan. 3,
2009).
103
NCAA, Our Mission, supra note 8.
104
Id.
105
See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at iii-v.
106
Id. at art. 2.11. The Principle Governing Recruiting is part of the NCAA Constitution
and is also applicable to both Division II and Division III member institutions. See NCAA, 2008-09
NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL art. 2.11 (2008), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/ProductsDetail
View.aspx?sku=D209; NCAA, 2008-09 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL art. 2.11 (2008), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/ProductsDetailView.aspx?sku=D309.
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playing-field, protect student-athletes, and emphasize the primacy of
education.107 Of course, the difference between the NCAA and the
TSSAA is the fact that one governs intercollegiate athletics and one high
school athletics. To some, this single difference is a critical one.108
Ultimately, however, it is unlikely that this difference is sufficient to
circumscribe the Court’s reasoning in Brentwood II from being applied
to the NCAA.
B.

High School vs. College: Why Brentwood II-Pickering
Jurisprudence Should Apply to NCAA Recruiting

Unquestionably, there are some universally recognized
differences between high school and college athletics.109 Because of these
differences, an argument can certainly be made that the recruiting
practices of high schools and colleges should receive different
constitutional protections. Indeed, there are situations in which courts
have distinguished between colleges and high schools when affording
First Amendment protection. For example, courts have limited the free
speech rights of high school students much more than those of college
students in certain circumstances.110 The basis for this distinction is the
idea that “high school students are less mature and the missions of the
respective institutions are different.”111
Because the Court has previously distinguished between high
schools and colleges when delineating free speech rights and because it
applied Pickering without much direction, it is arguable that the
TSSAA’s status as a high school athletic association was critical to the
107

See infra notes 128, 129 and accompanying text.
See Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670,
674-75 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (TSSAA “Guidelines for Understanding the ‘Recruiting Rule’ and
Understanding What Is ‘Undue Influence’” state, “High school athletics is not the same as colleges
recruiting high school athletes for college athletics. High school athletics exist[s] for an entirely
different reason.”), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), on remand, 262
F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001).
109
See supra note 108.
110
See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[C]ases dealing with the right of teaching institutions to
limit expressive freedom of students has been confined to high schools whose students and their
schools’ relation to them are different . . . from their counterparts in college education.”) (internal
citations omitted); see also Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The
Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1948 (2002)
(noting the “stark” distinction between the Court’s recognition of college and high school free
expression). But see Kerry Brain Melear, The First Amendment and Freedom of Press on the Public
University Campus: An Analysis of Hosty v. Carter, 216 ED. LAW REP. 293 (2007) (noting that this
distinction may begin to blur with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731
(7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006)).
In addition, courts have also limited the rights of children to be exposed to harmful
and inappropriate material. See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
111
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 740 (Evans, J., dissenting). Other courts have agreed that college
students are more mature than high school students. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274
n.14 (1981); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1970); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d
1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004).
108
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Supreme Court’s decision in Brentwood II. Under this argument, because
the TSSAA’s status was critical to the application of Pickering, the Court
could decide that its application is improper as to the NCAA, a college
athletic association.
Yet, while such a distinction is possible, it is unlikely the Court
would make it in the context of recruiting for three reasons. First, the
language and reasoning of the Brentwood II decision do not suggest a
different analysis would apply for college athletic associations. Second,
the Court has never distinguished between high schools and colleges
when applying Pickering. Third, the differences between high school and
college students and the missions of the respective institutions, both of
which warrant granting different constitutional protections in other
arenas, are largely irrelevant with regard to athletic recruiting.
1. Language and Reasoning of Brentwood II
Despite the fact that Brentwood II was a territory in which
Pickering had yet to be applied—i.e., speech by a private school that is a
member of a private athletic association—the Supreme Court had no
problem extending the public employee speech doctrine to the TSSAA’s
Anti-Recruiting Rule.112 There was little explanation underlying the
Court’s decision to apply the Pickering doctrine to the instant
circumstances. Rather, its application appeared to stem from the Court’s
determination to limit Brentwood Academy’s speech rights because of its
voluntary decision to join the TSSAA.113 So determined, the Court
decided that the Pickering line should apply because an “athletic league’s
interest in enforcing its rules” is similar to “the government’s interest in
running an effective workplace.”114
The Court’s failure to further explain exactly why it applied the
Pickering doctrine in Brentwood II suggests that the doctrine’s
application was based solely on Brentwood Academy’s voluntarily
112

This extension may seem logical since the TSSAA is a state actor and § 1983 liability
depends on whether the party is a state actor, not whether it is a public entity. See supra note 99.
However, extending Pickering here ignores the fact that an enterprise’s public entity status is critical
in the public employee speech context. See May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d
1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e acknowledge that cases such as Pickering and Connick give
public employees greater rights of free speech than private employees have, but this is not just for
the formalistic reason . . . that the First Amendment restricts only state action, and not private action.
The behavior of public enterprises is a political question . . . and since the employees of public
enterprises have insights and information about the conduct of the enterprise that the private citizen
lacks, they have a distinctive contribution to make to political speech.”). Arguably, the same
contribution cannot be made by an employee of a private enterprise that is also a state actor.
113
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
2489, 2496 (2007) (stating that “[h]igh school football is a game[, g]ames have rules,” and “[i]t is
only fair that Brentwood follow them”) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 2498-99
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Justice Kennedy has “little difficulty” in finding that the
recruiting rule does not violate the First Amendment based on Brentwood’s “consensual
membership” in the TSSAA).
114
Id. at 2495 (majority opinion).
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membership in the TSSAA. Because the NCAA is also an athletic league
in which its members voluntarily participate, it seems logical to assume
that the Court would apply the Pickering doctrine to the NCAA were an
NCAA recruiting ban at issue.115
Moreover, nothing in the language of the opinion suggests that
the application of the Pickering doctrine was limited only to a high
school athletic association. Notably, when choosing to apply Pickering,
Justice Stevens referred to athletic leagues in general, and not just high
school athletic leagues.116 This distinction is perhaps significant since, in
other parts of his opinion, Justice Stevens specifically referenced a high
school athletic league.117 Based on Justice Stevens’ usage of “athletic
league” instead of “high school athletic league,” in addition to his
emphasis on Brentwood Academy’s voluntary membership in the
TSSAA, it seems as though an NCAA recruiting ban would be
scrutinized under the Pickering doctrine.
2. Application of Pickering to High School and College
Employees
Because the Court did not distinguish between high school and
college athletic leagues in Brentwood II, it seems as though it would
apply Pickering regardless of the differences between high schools and
colleges. Moreover, the Supreme Court cases that have distinguished
between high schools and colleges have dealt with the free speech rights
of students, not teachers or employees.118 These cases would not be
applicable to a rule prohibiting recruitment by colleges and universities,
since such a rule seeks to limit the speech of the member institutions and
its employees, not the speech of students.
The Supreme Court has never distinguished between high school
teachers and college professors for the purpose of regulating employee
speech—indeed, the Pickering doctrine has been applied at both
education levels.119 Thus, the fact that the high school setting is markedly
different from that of a college should not be of consequence in

115

The Court has previously held that voluntary participation permits speech restrictions
even at the collegiate level. In Grove City College v. Bell, the Court held that, although Grove City
College was a private entity, because it voluntarily participated in a federal financial assistance
program, it was required to abide by Title IX as a condition of accepting the assistance. 465 U.S.
555, 575-76 (1984).
116
Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 (2007) (“Just as the government’s interest in
running an effective workplace can in some circumstances outweigh employee speech rights, so too
can an athletic league’s interest in enforcing its rules sometimes warrant curtailing the speech of its
voluntary participants.”) (internal citations omitted).
117
Id. at 2495-96.
118
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594-98 (1972) (junior college
professor’s speech); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564-67 (1968) (high school teacher’s
speech).
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determining whether to apply the Pickering doctrine to restrict the speech
of coaches.
Nevertheless, some courts have indicated that college professors
are entitled to more First Amendment protection in order to ensure
“academic freedom,”120 because universities are places of “free-wheeling
inquiry” and not designed for the “selective conveyance of ideas” like
high schools.121 Yet, regardless of whether or not college professors are
entitled to more protection than high school teachers, the reason behind
granting further protection, a teacher’s “right to choose classroom
content and methodology,”122 does not apply in the context of athletic
recruitment. In communicating with student-athletes about possibly
attending their institution and playing for their school’s athletic team,
college coaches are simply not choosing “classroom content and
methodology.”123
3. Differences Between High School and College Students and
Institutions
Even if the Court were inclined to find the difference between
the TSSAA and the NCAA important here,124 Pickering should still
apply. In certain areas, courts have distinguished between colleges and
high schools in terms of determining free speech rights.125 Generally,
there have been two reasons for such a distinction: (1) the different
missions of high schools and colleges and (2) the difference in maturity
between high school and college students.126 In the context of athletic
recruiting, these distinctions are largely immaterial.
First, the claimed missions of the respective associations are not
different in the context of athletics. Although some believe high school
athletics serves an entirely different purpose then college athletics,127 the
respective missions of both the NCAA and the TSSAA indicate
otherwise. For example, the purpose of the TSSAA is “to stimulate and
120

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006) (recognizing that there is an
argument that “expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates
additional constitutional interests” that are not fully protected by the public employee speech
doctrine); Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907,
912 (2006) (discussing that lower courts allow substantially more restrictions against primary and
secondary school teachers than college and university professors).
121
Kenneth Lasson, Controversial Speakers on Campus: Liberties, Limitations, and
Common-Sense Guidelines, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 39, 65 & n.127 (quoting Bd. of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
122
See Schauer, supra note 120, at 911.
123
Id.
124
The Court may, for example, find that the students have a right to access the
information, putting at issue the students’ First Amendment rights.
125
See discussion supra Part III.B.
126
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
127
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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regulate the athletic relations of the secondary schools in Tennessee.”128
Similarly, the purpose of the NCAA is to “govern competition in a fair,
safe, equitable, and sportsmanlike manner, and . . . integrate
intercollegiate athletics into higher education . . . .”129 In passing its
recruiting rule, the TSSAA asserted three interests: “(1) to keep high
school athletics in their proper place subordinate to academics[,] . . . (2)
to protect student athletes from exploitation[, and (3) to] foster[] a level
playing field between the various member schools.”130 Similarly, the
NCAA claims to promote “[t]he supporting role that intercollegiate
athletics plays in the higher education mission,” and the “collegiate
model of athletics in which students participate as an avocation . . . .”131
Moreover, the NCAA’s recruiting rules are set out “to shield
[prospective student-athletes] from undue pressures,”132 and “to protect
and enhance the physical and educational well-being of studentathletes.”133
Not only do the organizations’ stated missions and policies
indicate that the NCAA and the TSSAA have similar purposes, but at
least one court has agreed that high school and college athletics serve
similar purposes. According to the Tenth Circuit, there is “no more than
a difference in degree” between high school and college athletic
programs.134 The court continued:
The fundamental positions are the same, the goals are the same, the stakes are
pretty much the same. The same relationship also exists between the primary
academic functions of the schools in each category and the athletic programs.
The differences in degree or magnitude do not lead to a different result. In each,
the athletic program is very important, as are the many other diverse functions,
programs, and activities not within the academic core.135

Thus, while in terms of academics, the respective missions of
high schools and colleges may be different,136 in terms of athletics, the
missions of high schools and colleges are very similar: both seek to
promote athletics as a part of the educational experience. Because of
their similar missions, the Court need not distinguish between the
TSSAA and the NCAA when determining the extent to which the NCAA
can restrict its members’ speech.
128

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 673
(M.D. Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), on remand, 262
F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2001).
129
NCAA, Our Mission, supra note 8.
130
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Scholastic Athletic Ass’n, 262 F.3d 543, 557
(6th Cir. 2001).
131
NCAA, Our Mission, supra note 8.
132
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at art 2.11.
133
Id. at art. 2.2.
134
Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 570 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1978).
135
Id.
136
See Lasson, supra note 121, at 65 (Universities are places for “free-wheeling inquiry,”
while high schools are designed for the “selective conveyance of ideas.”).
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Second, a legal distinction between the maturity levels of high
school and college student-athletes is inappropriate in the context of
recruiting. Collegiate recruiting targets mostly high school students, not
college students.137 Thus, the target audience for college recruiting is not
college students, but rather, high school students. Consequently, in terms
of college athletic recruitment, the distinction between high school and
college students is inapplicable. Rather, the appropriate distinction is
between high school students and middle school students, who are the
subjects of high school recruiting. Hence, the critical question is whether
the Court would be inclined to distinguish between high school and
college recruiting on the ground that high school students are more
mature than middle school students.
Scholars generally agree that middle school children are less
mature than high school children.138 Interestingly though, it is not so clear
whether courts have made this distinction.139 Specifically concerning free
speech rights, some courts have been willing to grant greater rights to
students as they progress through elementary school, middle school, and
high school.140 However, in many instances the free speech rights of
children—specifically what speech they have the right to be exposed
to—have not been delineated along age-specific lines.141 Rather, the
government and most courts tend to lump all children142 under the same
rubric when determining the scope of their free speech rights.143 If the
Court were inclined to do the same, it is unlikely to think they would
distinguish between high school and middle school children when
considering whether to apply the Pickering doctrine to the NCAA.
Even if the Court were to distinguish between high school and
middle school children, it does not necessarily follow that it would grant
137

See Division I Men’s Basketball Academic Enhancement Working Group, Key
Research Findings Presented (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/governance/division_I/
management_council/2007/October/05_Add_B_BAEG.htm (reporting that thirteen percent of
Division I student-athletes are transfer students).
138
See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, HOW OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?:
THE AGES OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 28-29 (1989) (noting that twelfth graders have a
greater capacity for decision-making than seventh and eighth graders); LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR
BEST INTEREST? 53-54 (1992) (noting that a child’s capacity to make rational decisions generally
increases with age).
139
For example, in most states the age of majority for contracts is eighteen and no
distinction is made amongst children under eighteen. See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A.
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:3 (4th ed. 1993).
140
See, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that no decisions of the Courts of Appeals apply Tinker-based speech rights to the
elementary school setting, and that “[t]he ‘marketplace of ideas,’ an important theme in the high
school student expression cases, is a less appropriate description of an elementary school, where
children are just beginning to acquire the means of expression”).
141
See Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children From Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3,
43-44 (2004).
142
The definition of “children” is unclear, but it at least encompasses all minors under the
age of seventeen. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968).
143
See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-86 (1986); Ginsberg,
390 U.S. at 637; see also Etzioni, supra note 141, at 43-44.
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the NCAA less discretion to limit recruiting than the TSSAA. Notably,
while the Court has held that high school students are entitled to free
speech rights,144 it has also shown a willingness to limit these rights in
order to protect high school aged children from being exposed to
unsuitable speech. Accordingly, it has upheld certain government efforts
to limit the amount of speech high school aged children can be exposed
to both on and off school grounds.145 The basis for allowing such a
restriction is that exposure to such material may be harmful or
inappropriate for children,146 who may not be fully capable of making a
reasonable decision.147
The recruiting process similarly exposes high school aged
children to sensitive materials, which are inappropriate for or harmful to
them and negatively impact their decision-making.148 Thus, it is likely the
Court would seek to protect the recruits, increasing the likelihood that it
would apply the Pickering doctrine when contemplating the
constitutionality of an NCAA recruiting ban.
Recruiting has been greatly affected by the rising importance of
college athletics. Although colleges claim that sports are meant to serve
an educational purpose,149 college athletics has come to serve more than
just an educational purpose because athletic programs can produce a
substantial amount of revenue for the NCAA, their conferences, and their
schools.150 In addition to direct revenue, schools may accrue additional
144

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 511 (1969) (“It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
145
In Ginsberg, the Court held that it is constitutionally permissible for a State to protect
minors under seventeen from being exposed to potentially harmful materials—i.e., obscene sexual
materials. 390 U.S. at 637. The basis of this holding was the State’s constitutional power to regulate
the well-being of children. Id. at 639; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
272-73 (1988) (allowing a high school to prohibit its school newspaper from publishing what it
deemed to be unsuitable material).
146
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court allowed a high school to limit
its students’ speech, in part, to ensure that “readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may
be inappropriate for their level of maturity.” 484 U.S. at 271. The Court continued to hold that a
school “must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics.” Id. at 272. In
Ginsberg, the Court upheld the State law because it was rational for the State to conclude that
exposure to sex material could be harmful to children under seventeen. 390 U.S. at 639-43.
147
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (stating that the Court’s rulings that the
State could limit the freedom of children to make their own choices were based on “recognition that,
during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”).
148
See infra notes 159-175 and accompanying text.
149
See, e.g., Univ. of Mich. Athletic Dep’t, Mission Statement and Guiding Principles,
http://www.mgoblue.com/clubs/article.aspx?id=74106 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (“The individuals
who participate in our department at all levels can learn the benefits of teamwork, self-discipline,
personal responsibility, the setting of high standards, and the joy of achievement.”).
150
The NCAA’s total operating revenue for the 2007-2008 season was $614 million.
NCAA,
Revised
Budget
for
Fiscal
Year
Ending
August
31,
2008,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/resources/file/ebca1c0e7492aa3/2007-08%20BUDGET%20
(06-07%20Budget%20with%20moves).pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
NCAA Revised Budget].
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benefits because of college athletics, including increased tuition and fees,
increased exposure, and alumni donations.151 College athletics is also
popular with the student body and public at large.152 Because the amount
of revenue a college earns, the additional benefits it receives, and its
popularity depend highly on the athletic success of the institution,153
coaches get paid good money154 and are under intense pressure to have a
successful program.155
While large, this figure includes only money earned from NCAA-television contracts,
NCAA-conducted tournaments, and membership dues. Id. It does not include money earned from
bowl games, conference tournaments, ticket sales, and conference television contracts. See The
NCAA and Conference Affiliation, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 5, at 459, 464-66
[hereinafter Conference Affiliation]. Depending on the conference, the revenue that comes from
these sources can be quite substantial—in excess of $100 million. For example, the Southeastern
Athletic Conference (“SEC”) reported that its 2005-06 revenue was $116.1 million. SEC, 2005-2006
SEC Revenue Distribution, http://www.secsports.com/index.php?s=&url_channel_id=20&url_article_id=
7426&change_well_id=2 (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter SEC Revenue Distribution]. The
SEC is one of the “Big Six” conferences—the Atlantic Coast Conference (“ACC”), Big East, Big
Ten, Big 12, Pac-10, and SEC—each of which accumulates similar annual revenues. See Conference
Affiliation, supra, at 465-66.
Most of this money is distributed to the schools. NCAA Revised Budget, supra
(Roughly $466 million of the NCAA’s operating revenue was distributed to the schools.); SEC
Revenue Distribution, supra (noting that all of the $116.1 million was distributed to the twelve SEC
schools).
Notably, the statistics show that most athletic programs lose money. See ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE
SPORTS 172 (1999). However, despite this fact, many schools still try hard to turn athletics into a
revenue builder because of the potential for amassing substantial revenue. See id. at 164; Andy
Staples, In Big-Time Football Spending War, The Rich Get Richer, SI.COM, Nov. 18, 2008,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/11/18/spending/index.html?eref=T1.
Moreover, the deficits of athletic programs seem to be decreasing. See NCAA, 2002-03 REVENUES
AND EXPENSES OF DIVISIONS I AND II INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC PROGRAMS REPORT 18 (2003),
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/2002-03_d1_d2_rev_expd8af0a75a361-4cf9-bfde-32afdc06f5ca.pdf (last visited, Jan.3, 2009).
151
See Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: Restoring Educational Primacy to College
Basketball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 595, 601 (2002); see also Staples, supra note 150 (noting that
schools invest money in college football for “financial reasons, public relations reasons and
community building reasons”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 196 (noting college sports’ popularity and
importance in our culture).
153
A large part of the NCAA revenue is distributed to Division-I conferences according
to their past success in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament. See Roger C. Noll, The Business of
College Sports and the High Cost of Winning, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 5, at 477,
482-85. Also, the money conferences receive for bowl games, television contracts, etc., depends
highly on the success of their schools. See Keith Darcé, Boost from Bowls, SIGNONSANDIEGO.COM,
Dec. 23, 2007, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/business/20071223-9999-1b23bowls.html
(reporting that the conferences whose schools played in the 2007 Poinsettia Bowl, a low-level bowl,
received $750,000, the conferences whose schools played in the 2007 Holiday Bowl, considered a
mid-level bowl, earned $2.5 million, and the conferences whose teams played in the BCS bowls, the
most prestigious bowls, earned the most).
While many are skeptical that athletic success leads to increased alumni giving, see
ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 167-69 (1999), there is evidence that athletic success can result in an
increase in applications and an expansion in the student body. See id. at 169-71.
154
See BRUCE FELDMAN, MEAT MARKET: INSIDE THE SMASH-MOUTH WORLD OF
COLLEGE FOOTBALL RECRUITING 57 (2007) (citing a 2006 USA Today study which reported that 42
of 119 Division I-A college football coaches made over $1 million).
155
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 203-04 (stating that coaches are expected to
produce winners and if they do not they are fired); Bobby Bowden, Tension, Pain, Satisfaction:
Inside the Recruiting Game, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1988, § 5, at 7 (same).
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Recruiting is vital to the success of the program. According to
Bobby Bowden, the current coach of the Florida State University football
team and the winningest coach in NCAA Division I-A football history,156
“National championships can be won in February by those who sign the
best prospects.”157 Even low-profile sports rely heavily on recruiting.
According to the former Harvard women’s swimming coach, Maura
Costin Scalise, ninety-five percent of her success was due to recruiting.158
Because of the importance of recruiting premiere prospects,
coaches take recruiting very seriously.159 Many coaches are willing to use
whatever means necessary to obtain recruits’ services.160 Examples of the
measures taken by teams to lure recruits include exposing recruits to
drugs, alcohol, and sex,161 providing recruits with money and jobs,162
altering grades and test scores,163 harassing recruits,164 and even
misleading recruits.165 In addition, coaches consistently attempt to
capitalize on the emotions and fantasies of the young and impressionable
recruits, many of whom dream of being a college and professional sports
star.166 By including recruits in such a corrupt process, coaches create an
156

Florida State University, Official Athletic Site of Florida State University: Bobby
Bowden Profile, http://seminoles.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/bowden_bobby01.html (last visited
Jan. 24, 2008).
157
Bowden, supra note 155, at 57.
158
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING THE GAME: COLLEGE SPORTS
AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 43 (2003).
159
For an insightful and in-depth account of the intensity of the recruiting process for bigtime college football, see FELDMAN, supra note 154; see also Bowden, supra note 155, at 57 (stating
that the recruiting team at Florida State included “one full-time secretary, 10 assistant coaches and
five graduate assistants”).
160
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 204 (“The incentive is clear: do all you can to win.
Whatever it takes.”); Bowden, supra note 155, at 57 (discussing how the pressure to win leads some
coaches to cheat); O’Neil, supra note 12 (discussing how coaches resort to ethically questionable
tactics to lure recruits).
161
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; see also MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE
SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS. THE UNIVERSITY 248 (1990) (discussing how
colleges have attractive women “date” recruits for their weekend visit).
162
See JOHN F. ROONEY, JR., THE RECRUITING GAME 136-37 (1980) (noting that schools
sometimes provide players with cars, apartments, money, and questionable or non-existent jobs).
163
See id.
164
See Text-Messaging Ban to Be Implemented Aug. 1, ESPN.COM, Apr. 26, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2850555 (reporting a story of one athlete “waking up
and having 52 text messages”).
165
See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). Ross was a promising
high school basketball player recruited to play at Creighton University. Id. at 411. According to
Ross, he was assured that he “would receive a meaningful education while at Creighton.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). However, it was evident that Ross was not capable of receiving such
an education. See id. at 412; see infra note 176 and accompanying text; see also ROONEY, supra note
162, at 136 (noting that coaches sometimes “promis[e] one package of financial aid and deliver[]
another” to recruits).
166
See SPERBER, supra note 161, at 249 (claiming that the recruiting process “offer[s] a
fantasy world filled with free and almost unlimited pleasures”); Bowden, supra note 155 (stating that
part of the recruiting process is “inflat[ing] the egos of 17-year-old athletes,” only to deflate them
later); Staples, supra note 4 (quoting the director of football recruiting at Oregon University as
saying that “[w]e had to find a way to make [recruits] larger than life”) (internal quotations omitted);
College Recruiting: Are Student Athletes Being Protected: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
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environment that is harmful and inappropriate for high school aged
children.167 This is evidenced by the inability of recruits to make a wellreasoned decision amidst this environment.
While high school students may be more capable of making a
reasonable decision than eighth graders, some scholars suggest that even
twelfth graders’ decision-making ability is hampered by their yetuncontrolled emotions. According to Anna Freud,168 the decision-making
capabilities of adolescents are negatively impacted by their emotions and
fantasies more so than adults, lessening the likelihood that an adolescent
will make a well-reasoned decision.169 Perhaps, by catering to the
fantasies and emotions of student-athletes, the recruiting process inhibits
the ability of recruits to make a reasonable decision as to where to attend
college.170 Specific evidence supports the idea that many prospective
student-athletes make a less than well-reasoned decision when
determining which college to attend. For example, recruits have chosen
schools based solely on their dreams of playing professional sports,171
fake books and magazine covers that played on these dreams,172 their
weariness with the recruiting process,173 and even what number they can
wear.174 Moreover, when committing to a school, recruits sign letters of
intent that are borderline unconscionable.175

Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th
Cong. 20-25 (2004) (testimony of Don McPherson, Executive Director, Sports Leadership Institute,
Adelphi University) [hereinafter McPherson Testimony]. According to Don McPherson, the
Executive Director of the Sports Leadership Institute at Adelphi University, for many elite studentathletes, “higher education is not in their plans” and they have little interest in being in college. Id. at
24. Rather, college sports is a “stepping stone” to the next level of play: professional sports. Id.
167
See SPERBER, supra note 161, at 248 (“Once on campus the recruit experiences fortyeight hours of high-pressure sales pitches and higher-pressure pleasures.”).
168
Freud was a leading researcher in the field of child psychiatry. Cf. GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 138, at 1.
169
Id. at 31-35.
170
Recruits, even those with non-professional aspirations, place a lot of emphasis on
recruiting when determining which school to attend. JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN,
THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 312 (2001). According to one
study, which polled student-athletes at some Division I-A, Ivy League, and Coed Liberal Arts
Colleges, in 1989 73% of all male student-athletes said being recruited was a “very important”
reason for choosing their college. Id. This number rose from 36% in 1976. Id. For women, the
number was only 29%, but this was up from 4% in 1976. Id. at 334. The authors speculate that both
of these numbers have likely since increased. Id. at 259-60.
171
See McPherson Testimony, supra note 166. Unfortunately, the reality of the situation
is that almost all—i.e., over ninety-five percent—of college athletes will not continue to play sports
at a professional level. See NCAA, Estimated Probability of Competing in Athletics Beyond the
Interscholastic High School Level, http://www.ncaa.org/research/prob_of_competing/ (last visited
Jan. 4, 2009).
172
See Staples, supra note 4 (noting that several recruits chose to attend the University of
Oregon because of fake comic books, in which the recruits led the team to a national championship,
and fake Sports Illustrated covers, in which a recruit was holding the Heisman Trophy).
173
See, e.g., BOWEN & LEVIN, supra note 158, at 49 (stating that some athletes commit to
a school merely to end the recruiting process).
174
See FELDMAN, supra note 154, at 304. Feldman recounted the press conference of
Robert Elliott, a recruit who decided to attend Mississippi State University because
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The fact that recruits engage in such suspect practices when
deciding where to go to college indicates that the recruiting process may
be inappropriate for many recruits, or, at worst, even harmful to them.176
Since the Supreme Court has shown a predisposition to protect high
school aged children from being exposed to inappropriate or harmful
materials, it is reasonable to believe that the Court would not afford high
school student-athletes greater access to recruiting speech than it gave to
middle school student-athletes in Brentwood II.177
4. Summary
Although the NCAA and the TSSAA govern student-athletes of
different ages, there are a variety of reasons why the Supreme Court
would not distinguish between the two in the context of recruiting.
Specifically, the language and reasoning of the Brentwood II decision
and prior Supreme Court jurisprudence suggest such a difference is
immaterial. Consequently, it seems that the same legal standards the
Supreme Court used to evaluate the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule
would govern an NCAA recruiting ban. Under these standards, the
NCAA would have the authority to impose restrictions so long as those
restrictions do not contravene the Pickering doctrine. Accordingly, an
NCAA recruiting ban would only be upheld if it would survive scrutiny
under the Pickering doctrine.

Coach Croom told me I could come in and wear No. 2. It was really where I could go and
feel comfortable and rock my No. 2. I’ve been wearing it since Pee Wee, and that’s the
only number I can rock. If I put something else on, it won’t look right on me. I figure,
you’ve got to look good to play good. I can’t wear those double-digit numbers.
Id.

175

See Seth Davis, To Sign or Not to Sign, SI.COM, Nov. 14, 2008,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/seth_davis/11/13/national.letter/index.html. Letters of
Intent are forms signed by recruits which bind the recruits to a school. Id. They are voluntary, overly
restrictive, non-negotiable, and very difficult to rescind. Id. While recruits get some benefit from
them, according to Davis they are unfair and even “farcical.” Id. According to Pete Rush, a lawyer
quoted in the piece, they may be unconscionable. Id. Nonetheless, every year over “30,000
[student-]athletes sign national letters of intent” because, according to Davis, “that’s what everybody
does.” Id.
176
See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992). Ross enrolled at
Creighton from 1978 to 1982 but did not receive nearly enough credits to graduate. Id. After he left
Creighton, Ross enrolled “for a year of remedial education at the Westside Preparatory
School[,] . . . attend[ing] classes with grade school children.” Id. He later enrolled at Roosevelt
University. Id. After dropping out of Roosevelt, Ross had a “‘major depressive episode,’ during
which he barricaded himself in a Chicago motel room and threw furniture out the window” in an
expression of anger against “Creighton employees who had wronged him.” Id.
177
Importantly, this Note is not suggesting that Ginsberg or Hazelwood would be the
basis for limiting recruiting speech. Rather, it is suggesting that, because the Court has previously
protected high school students from inappropriate and harmful speech, it would be less inclined to
distinguish between high school and college recruiting when determining whether to apply the
Pickering doctrine to a hypothetical NCAA recruiting ban.
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Why an NCAA Recruiting Ban Would Survive Scrutiny Under
Pickering

If the Court were inclined to subject an NCAA recruiting ban to
the Pickering doctrine, the next inquiry would be whether such a ban
would be constitutional under the three-pronged test. As indicated above,
the first part of this test asks whether the employee is speaking as a
private citizen.178 If the employee is speaking as a private citizen, a court
must then determine whether the employee is speaking on a matter of
public concern.179 Finally, if the employee meets these threshold
requirements, a court must apply a balancing test to determine whether
the employee’s interests as a citizen in commenting upon matters of
public concern outweigh the employer’s interest in promoting the
efficiency of its operation.180 Put more succinctly, the three-pronged
Pickering doctrine holds that, when employees are speaking as citizens
about matters of public concern, their speech can be restricted only when
necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.181
1. Employee Speaking as a Citizen
Although in Brentwood II the Court did not address this
threshold issue, assuming instead that Coach Flatt was speaking as a
citizen,182 it is likely that a college coach’s recruiting speech would not
survive scrutiny under Garcetti.183 In Garcetti, the Supreme Court
concluded that “when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes . . . .”184 Although it did state that a formal job
description is not dispositive of an employee’s official duties,185 the Court
did not provide a framework for defining the scope of an employee’s
official duties, leaving the task to the lower courts.186 As a result, lower
courts have relied on the rationale of Garcetti187 as well as their own
178

See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
180
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
181
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
2489, 2495 (2007).
182
Id.
183
Notably, in Garcetti, the Court declined to decide whether the threshold requirement
would apply to speech involving “academic scholarship or classroom instruction.” Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006). However, since recruiting involves neither “academic
scholarship” nor “classroom instruction,” there is no reason to think the Court would not extend
Garcetti to an NCAA recruiting ban.
184
Id. at 1960.
185
Id. at 1961-62. The Court’s fear was that an employer could overly restrict an
employee’s rights by creating broad job descriptions. Id.
186
Id. at 1961.
187
See, e.g., Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“Garcetti did not explicate what it meant to speak ‘pursuant to’ one’s ‘official duties’ . . . . Thus, in
order to determine whether Williams wrote these memoranda pursuant to his responsibilities as
179
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definitions of “official duties” in determining whether speech could be
restricted.188 Under either analysis, recruiting speech does not pass this
threshold test.
First, the rationale behind Garcetti indicates that recruiting
speech is spoken pursuant to a college coach’s official duties. In
Garcetti, the Supreme Court stipulated that an employer can restrict
speech that “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional
responsibilities.”189 Accordingly, it distinguished Garcetti, in which
Richard Ceballos, because of his duties as a deputy district attorney,
notified his superiors about misstatements made in affidavits, from
Pickering, in which Pickering challenged a school’s allocation of
financial resources. The Court explained that Pickering’s speech “had no
official significance and bore similarities to letters submitted by
numerous citizens every day.”190 Certainly, recruiting speech is much
closer to Ceballos’ speech than Pickering’s. Unlike the speech in
Pickering, recruiting speech is promulgated only as a requirement of the
position and bears little resemblance to other citizens’ communications.
Clearly then, recruiting speech “owes its existence”191 to a college
coach’s responsibility to recruit student-athletes.
Second, recruiting also falls under the “official duties” of a
college coach, as defined by lower courts. Lower courts have commonly
defined “official duties” as activities performed by an employee that are
required as part of his or her job.192 Recruiting speech is certainly a
required part of a college coach’s job. Most, if not all, college coaches’
official job descriptions include recruiting prospective student-athletes.193
This requirement is not hollow; given the importance of recruiting, it is
unquestionable that recruiting is a required part of the job.194
Athletic Director, we must also look to the facts and rationale underlying Garcetti.”); Jackson v.
Jimino, 506 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109-11 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting the notion that Garcetti created a
bright-line rule, choosing instead to apply a fact-based inquiry when determining whether an
employee speaks as a citizen).
188
See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
189
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
See, e.g., Williams, 480 F.3d at 693 (holding that job-required speech is unprotected
because it falls within a public employee’s official duties); Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr.,
451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (same).
193
See, e.g., Bates College, Job Opening: Head College Squash Coach,
http://www.squashtalk.com/jobs/2007/jobs07-30.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (listing recruiting
contacts and communication as “essential job functions”); College of the Holy Cross, Assistant
Coach Men’s Baseball, http://holycross.interviewexchange.com/jobofferdetails.jsp;jsessionid=0026F49A8
67D037E77804FB0E2968659?JOBID=7415 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (describing job
responsibilities as “assist[ing] with all areas of the program including, but not limited to, coaching
and recruiting”).
194
See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text. As further evidence of the
importance of recruiting, see SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 170, at 259, in which the authors
discuss just how prevalent recruiting is. According to Shulman and Bowen, almost twenty years ago,
about ninety percent of the men who played basketball, football, and hockey, and two-thirds of men
playing other sports, reported that they were recruited. Id. Moreover, the authors reported that when
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Since recruiting is an “official duty” of a college coach and
recruiting speech “owes its existence” to this duty, a challenge to an
NCAA recruiting ban would not survive scrutiny under Garcetti.195
Failure to satisfy this threshold requirement would end the inquiry
immediately and result in the upholding of an NCAA recruiting ban as a
valid restriction of its members’ speech.
2. Speech as a Matter of Public Concern
Even if a court does conclude that a coach recruiting prospective
student-athletes speaks as a private citizen, that speech must address a
matter of public concern in order to survive the second threshold
inquiry.196 As the Supreme Court stated in Connick v. Myers, whether an
employee speaks on a matter of public concern is determined by the
“content, form, and context” of the speech.197 In Myers, the Court
concluded that Myers’ questionnaire to fellow assistant district attorneys
did not constitute a matter of public concern because it was a “mere
extension[]” of a personal grievance with the employer.198
Since Connick, the contours of the public concern test have not
been distinctly defined;199 however, subsequent cases have provided
some guidance. For example, in Rankin v. McPherson,200 the Court held
that private remarks made to a co-worker expressing support for an
assassination attempt on the President constituted a matter of public
concern.201 Through its holding, the Court emphasized that speech need
not be made public, and can be either inappropriate or controversial, to

asked about the odds someone could appear on campus and make a team without the coach knowing
them, an admissions dean answered “essentially zero.” Id. at 39.
Notably, two years later, Bowen and Levin reported numbers which indicated that the
number of recruited athletes may be a little lower than the original numbers. BOWEN & LEVIN, supra
note 158, at 419. Importantly though, Bowen and Levin applied a more demanding definition of
“recruited athletes” that surely did not include all recruits. Compare id. at 69 (recruited athletes are
athletes “who were on a coach’s list at the time admissions decisions were being made”), with
SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 170, at 38 (recruited athletes were determined by student-athlete
surveys).
195
Although the applicable relationship here might be the NCAA-member institution
arrangement, an argument that the Court would look at the member institution’s official duties is
misguided given the Court’s language in Brentwood II. By assuming that Coach Flatt was speaking
as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and not Brentwood Academy, the Court seemed to
indicate that the duties of the coach were at issue in a Garcetti inquiry, not the school. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 (2007).
196
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
197
461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
198
Id. at 148.
199
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam) (“Although the
boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined, Connick provides some guidance.”).
200
483 U.S. 378 (1987).
201
Id. at 386-87. While engaged in a private conversation about an assassination attempt
on the President, McPherson told a co-worker “if they go for him again, I hope they get him.” Id. at
381. The comment was overheard by another employee and reported to the employer, who fired
McPherson. Id. at 381-82.
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constitute a matter of public concern.202 In City of San Diego v. Roe, the
Court held that a police officer’s sexually explicit videos did not
constitute a matter of public concern.203 In its holding, the Court
attempted to clarify the definition of what constitutes public concern,
stating that “public concern is something that is a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public at the time of publication.”204
Despite this guidance, lower federal courts have found the public
concern test to be imprecise.205 As a result, courts have taken different
approaches in determining what constitutes a matter of public concern.
Some courts have focused on whether the speech was made as an
employee or as a private citizen.206 Other courts have focused on whether
the content of the speech was of private interest or of concern to the
community as a whole.207 This disagreement over how to define “a matter
of public concern” only demonstrates that the public concern test is a
fact-based inquiry, the outcome of which depends on the content, form,
and context of the particular speech.208
The content, form, and context of recruiting speech indicate that
it would not constitute speech on a matter of public concern. Recruiting
speech entails one-on-one communications between coaches and players
that focus on student-athletes’ ambitions to attend and compete at the
respective institution.209 This type of speech concerns an individual
202

Id. at 386-87.
Roe, 543 U.S. at 79, 84.
204
Id. at 83-84.
205
See, e.g., Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989).
206
See Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2002); Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3
F.3d 117, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Charles W. Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall
Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1181 (2007). Of
course, with the Court’s decision in Garcetti, it would seem that this issue would be addressed prior
to asking whether the speech touches on a matter of public concern.
207
See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (6th Cir. 2001); see
also Walter E. Kuhn, Note, First Amendment Protection of Teacher Instructional Speech, 55 DUKE
L.J. 995, 1005 (2006).
208
See Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 271 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Our fact-specific
resolution of individual cases has done little to sharpen the line between cases where the complaints
about discrimination are matters of public concern and those where such complaints are not matters
of public concern.”); Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 75 (1988) (suggesting that lower courts have been
inconsistent in determining what constitutes speech on a matter of public concern because of the
“almost unbridled discretion given [to] the courts under Connick”); Rhodes, supra note 206, at 1184
(calling public concern standards “fact-dependent and not always predictable”).
209
For an example of the kind of issues the recruits and coaches discuss, see FELDMAN,
supra note 154, at 154-75 (detailing the efforts of The University of Mississippi coaches to get a
recruit to meet minimum eligibility requirements, which focused solely on the young man’s
eligibility, and, of course, football—two interests entirely personal to the recruit).
Of course, some speech that could be considered recruiting speech would not be so
personal in nature—i.e., billboards or brochures advertising the school and its athletic program.
While such speech could presumably be considered as addressing a matter of public concern, it is
not at issue here since a NCAA rule similar to the TSSAA’s rule would not prohibit such speech.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495
(2007).
203
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student’s personal interest in playing athletics at a particular institution.
It cannot be said to concern community-wide interests, such as
discrimination or governance, since it is not the “subject of legitimate
news interest” or “of general interest and of value and concern to the
public.”210
Moreover, the intent of the speech is not to address a matter of
public concern, which, according to at least one Circuit Court of
Appeals, is important in discerning whether the employee was addressing
a matter of public concern.211 Rather, the goal of recruiting speech is to
attract prospective student-athletes to the school’s athletic program.212
Thus, even if some discussion took place that was of a general interest to
the public, it would still not necessarily constitute speech on a matter of
public concern.213 Combining this with the fact that coaches recruit as
part of their professional duties,214 it is evident that speech intended to
recruit a student-athlete to a college or university does not address a
matter of public concern.215
3. Pickering Balancing Test
If a court were to determine that a college coach recruiting a
student-athlete is an employee speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
concern—or if it assumes as much, as did the Brentwood II Court—the
final determination would be whether the NCAA’s interest in efficiency
210

City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (per curiam). An example of
private remarks that implicate the general interest of the public is displayed in Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378 (1987). In Rankin, an employee made private remarks to another employee about her
views on the attempted assassination of the President. Id. at 381-82. The Court held these remarks to
be a matter of public concern, given the fact that they were delivered on the heels of “heightened
public attention” on presidential assassinations. Id. at 386. Discussions over a recruit’s ability to
compete at a college or university does not similarly pique the interest of the public.
211
Salehpoor v. Shahinpoor, 358 F.3d 782, 787 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The court will also
consider the motive of the speaker to learn if the speech was calculated to redress personal
grievances or to address a broader public purpose.” (citing Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 482-83
(10th Cir. 1994))).
212
See supra note 209.
213
In Connick, the Court stated, “[Speech] not otherwise of public concern does not attain
the status because its subject matter could, in different circumstances, have been the topic of a
communication to the public that might be of general interest.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148
n.8 (1983). Following this reasoning, even if the subject matter of recruiting speech could, in some
circumstances, be considered addressing a matter of general interest to the public, because the intent
of the speech is to address personal, and not public, concerns, it does not necessarily attain public
concern status.
214
See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
215
For an example of what courts have found to be matters of public concern, see
Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 112-14 (2d Cir. 2003) (letter criticizing mayor’s administration
was a matter of public concern); Victor v. McElveen, 150 F.3d 451, 456 (5th Cir. 1998) (protest
against racial discrimination was a matter of public concern). For an example of the what courts
have not found to be matters of public concern, see Alexander v. Eeds, 392 F.3d 138, 145-46 (5th
Cir. 2004) (complaints about police department’s promotion process were not a matter of public
concern); Salehpoor, 358 F.3d at 788 (complaint of theft of student’s research was not a matter of
public concern).
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and effectiveness outweigh the school’s free speech rights.216 The Court’s
most recent articulation of the Pickering balancing test—in Brentwood
II—is that when an employee speaks as a citizen about matters of public
concern, an employer can only impose those restrictions that are
necessary for it to operate efficiently and effectively.217 Like the
threshold inquiries, in applying the Pickering balancing test, the Court
requires a fact-based, case-by-case assessment of both the employer’s
interest in operating efficiently and effectively and the employee’s
interest in free speech.218
The Brentwood II decision provides some valuable guidance for
evaluating an NCAA recruiting ban. According to the Brentwood II
Court, there are a number of harms that could prevent a high school
sports association from operating efficiently and effectively.219 These
harms include exploitation of students, lack of competition, and an
athletic-centric environment.220 Because the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting
Rule discourages these harms, the Court held that the Rule is necessary
for the association’s efficient and effective operation and thus a valid
speech restriction.221 Thus, it follows that if (1) recruiting high school
student-athletes leads to similar harms; (2) these harms detract from the
NCAA’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively; and (3) an NCAA
recruiting ban discourages these harms, then it would be upheld under
the Pickering balancing test.
While the Supreme Court did not rely on empirical evidence to
support its conclusion that recruiting middle school students could lead
to exploitation, distortion of competition, and creation of a culture that
values athletics over academics,222 specific evidence shows that collegiate
recruiting harbors these evils. First, the recruitment of student-athletes
has lead to their exploitation. As discussed above, the NCAA, its
conferences, and its schools receive substantial revenue as a result of
college athletics.223 Despite this fact, none of the revenue is distributed
directly to the players themselves.224 Rather, for their athletic
216

See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
2489, 2495 (2007).
218
See Bd. of County Comm’rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 677
(1996) (“Pickering requires a fact-sensitive and deferential weighing of the government’s legitimate
interests.”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) (“Because of the enormous variety
of fact situations in which critical statements by . . . public employees may be thought by their
superiors . . . to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to
attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged.”).
219
Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2496 (2007).
220
Id. at 2495-96.
221
Id. at 2496.
222
Id. at 2495-96.
223
See supra note 150.
224
See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at art. 12.1.2 (establishing that an
individual is ineligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics if he or she accepts payment for
playing).
217
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participation, the majority of student-athletes are compensated with a
free college education and any other benefits that exist from playing an
intercollegiate sport.225 Whether or not this consideration is sufficient, the
basis of this exchange is undermined by recruiting.226
Because of the emphasis placed on winning in college athletics,
the importance of acquiring physically gifted student-athletes cannot be
understated.227 To acquire these top athletes, many coaches recruit
student-athletes based solely on their physical skills, paying little
attention to their academic qualifications, so long as they meet the
minimum NCAA requirements.228 As a result, many of these physically
gifted athletes are not academically qualified to attend the institution,229
but are able to attend because college admissions offices lower their
academic standards in order to ensure the student-athletes’ admission.230
This is problematic because it will be harder for these
unqualified student-athletes to receive a meaningful education.231 Coming
into school, the recruits are at a disadvantage because they are
academically unqualified to attend the school. Moreover, while attending
school they have to devote much of their time to athletics, instead of
focusing on academics.232 Because of the combination of these two
factors, it is arguable that many, or at least some, student-athletes are not
receiving the requisite college education.233 By depriving many recruits

225

See James J. Duderstadt, Intercollegiate Athletics and the American University: A
University President’s Perspective, in THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 5, at 560-61.
226
See id. at 561 (claiming that “recruiting college athletes based entirely on physical
skills rather than academic promise undermines [the] premise [of this exchange]”).
227
See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
228
FELDMAN, supra note 154, at 157-75; see also infra note 242.
229
See Jim Naughton, Athletes Lack Grades and Test Scores of Other Students, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jul. 25, 1997, at A43.
230
Bowen and Levin provide a detailed analysis of the admissions advantage for recruited
athletes. BOWEN & LEVIN, supra note 158, at 69-79. Specifically, the statistics they provide show
that a high percentage of academically unqualified athletes get admitted to the country’s most
prestigious universities. Id. at 74-75; see also Lynch, supra note 151, at 602 (discussing how athletes
that fail to meet school’s admissions requirements can still be admitted through special admission
processes, often with “no questions asked”).
231
See William C. Dowling, To Cleanse Colleges of Sports Corruption, End Recruiting
Based on Physical Skills, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jul. 9, 1999, at B9.
232
See SPERBER, supra note 161, at 303 (reporting that many teams require fifty hours of
participation a week).
233
While graduation rates are roughly the same for athletes and non-athletes, see NCAA,
Overall Division I Graduation Rates, http://web1.ncaa.org/app_data/instAggr2007/1_0.pdf (last
visited Jan. 3, 2009), that does not necessarily mean they are receiving a quality education. See, e.g.,
BOWEN & LEVIN, supra note 158, at 129-34, 146-49 (providing statistics that show recruited athletes
generally perform worse than the remaining student body); SPERBER, supra note 161, at 301 (stating
that many athletes, including those in low-profile Division I sports, “receive degrees but no
education”); ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 39-41 (arguing that even student-athletes that graduate
sometimes receive “totally hollow degrees”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dowling, supra
note 231, at B9 (claiming that big-time college athletes cannot succeed in school); Pete Thamel, Top
Grades and No Class Time for Auburn Players, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 2006, at A1 (discussing how
football players at Auburn University took classes that did not require attendance and received
substantially higher grades for them).
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of a meaningful college education, colleges undermine the basic
exchange with student-athletes and exploit them for athletic success.234
Second, the recruitment of student-athletes has led to a distortion
of competition between colleges. Although a new team or two may
contend each year, for the most part, every year the same teams compete
for an NCAA championship.235 This trend is neither limited to the high
profile sports of men’s basketball and football,236 nor to Division I.237
This lack of competition is a direct result of recruiting. Given coaches’
claims as to the importance of recruiting to a program’s success,238 it
should be no surprise that success on the recruiting trail has led to
success on the playing field.239 Therefore, since recruiting is integral in

234

WALTER BYERS & CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING
COLLEGE ATHLETES 299 (1995) (claiming “that the college admissions office and faculty exploit the
athlete by taking on board a poorly prepared student and providing to him or her course work of
minimum quality so the athlete can meet minimum eligibility standards”).
235
For example, from 2002-2007, several teams have appeared in the top ten of the final
Associated Press (AP) college football poll multiple times, including the University of Southern
California six times, the Ohio State University five times, and Louisiana State University, Georgia
University, Oklahoma University, and the University of Texas four times. ESPN College Football,
2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?seasonYear=2007&pollId=1
(last visited Mar. 3, 2009); ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?seasonYear=2006&pollId=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009);
ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?
seasonYear=2005&pollId=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA
Football Rankings—Final, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?seasonYear=2004&pollId=1 (last
visited Mar. 3, 2009); ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?seasonYear=2003&pollId=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009);
ESPN College Football, 2008 NCAA Football Rankings—Final, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/rankings?
seasonYear=2002&pollId=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). Perhaps more indicative of the lack of
competition is that only three teams of the sixty spots in the final top ten for the past six years were
from schools outside the “Big Six” conferences. Id.
236
In fact, the lack of competition may be more prevalent in low-profile sports. See, e.g.,
NCAA, Division I Women’s Volleyball Champions, http://www.ncaa.com/history/w-volleyballd1.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (Only ten different schools have won a national championship in
Division I women’s volleyball in twenty-seven years.); NCAA, Division I Indoor Track & Field—
Team Champions, http://www.ncaa.com/history/indoortrack-d1.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009)
(Arkansas University has been the men’s Division I national indoor track and field champion
nineteen times in the past twenty-five years.).
237
See,
e.g.,
D3football.com,
D3football.com
Top
25,
http://www.d3football.com/top25/2007/week-0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); D3football.com,
D3football.com Top 25, http://www.d3football.com/top25/2006/week-0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009);
D3football.com, D3football.com Top 25, http://www.d3football.com/top25/2005/week-0 (last visited
Feb. 9, 2009); D3football.com, D3football.com Top 25, http://www.d3football.com/top25/2004/week-0
(last visited Feb. 9, 2009); D3football.com, D3football.com Top 25, http://www.d3football.com/top25/
2003/week-0 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). From 2003-2007, several teams appeared in the
D3football.com preseason top ten multiple times including Mount Union, St. John’s and Mary
Hardin-Baylor five times, and Linfield four times. Id.
238
See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
239
Many of the teams that consistently place in the top ten of the final AP college football
poll have also been recognized as having a top ten recruiting class by college football pundits. See
Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? (last
visited Jan. 24, 2008). From 2002-2008, several teams placed among the top ten in terms of strength
of recruiting class multiple times according to Rivals.com, including Georgia University seven
times, and Oklahoma University, Louisiana State University, and University of Southern California
five times. Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp?
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establishing success on the playing field, it follows that it is a, if not the,
driving force behind the current lack of competition in college athletics.
Third, the recruitment of student-athletes fosters an environment
in which athletics is valued more than academics. Because of the
heightened importance of college athletics to institutions, the fact that
education is the primary reason for attending college is sometimes lost.240
Thus, instead of an environment which attempts to integrate athletics and
academics, a different environment emerges which often forces the
student-athlete to choose between athletic and academic success.241
Recruitment of student-athletes encourages such an environment, since
recruiting focuses on the physical skills of a student-athlete, often at the
expense of academic qualifications.242 By allowing this type of recruiting
and by encouraging it through the admission of academically unqualified
student-athletes, colleges are contributing to a culture that values athletic
excellence at the expense of academic success, the third harm mentioned
by the Brentwood II Court.
Like the effect of these harms on the TSSAA, each one of these
harms impacts the NCAA’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively.
postype=0&sort=0&year=2008 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team
Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? postype=0&sort=0&year=2007 (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp?
postype=0&sort=0&year=2006 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team
Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? postype=0&sort=0&year=2005 (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp?
postype=0&sort=0&year=2004 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team
Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp? postype=0&sort=0&year=2003 (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009); Rivals.com, Football Recruiting: Team Rankings, http://rivals100.rivals.com/TeamRank.asp?
postype=0&sort=0&year=2002 (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). This correlates highly with the AP top
ten. See supra note 235.
240
This fact gets lost on both the players and coaches. See Dowling, supra note 231, at B9
(discussing a scandal at the University of Minnesota, in which a tutor revealed that she had
completed 400 assignments for men’s basketball players from 1993 to 1998); Mark Schlabach,
Younger Harrick Blamed for Fraud, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 21, 2003, at C1 (reporting an
investigation that revealed that the assistant men’s basketball coach at the University of Georgia, Jim
Harrick, Jr., lied about his teaching credentials to get a physical education position at the school,
misled the university as to how the class would be taught, and gave an “A” to three players who
failed to attend class, do class work, and take the final exam); Andy Staples, Economics of Recruiting,
SI.COM, Feb. 6, 2009, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/andy_staples/01/23/recruiting.economics/
1.html (reporting on a study which found that, for top college football recruits, graduation rates had
no measurable effect on their choice of school).
This fact also gets lost on schools. See Lynch, supra note 151, at 602-06, 608. Lynch’s
article provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between college athletics—specifically
basketball—and academics. In arguing that many elite college programs may have lost sight of
“educational primacy,” id. at 605, Lynch highlights instances where the desire for athletic success
impedes on the academic missions of universities. Id. at 602-06, 608. Some of the examples relevant
to this Note include: coaches steering athletes to less demanding majors or courses to ensure they
will meet NCAA eligibility requirements, athletes spending forty to sixty hours a week on their
sports, and regular season games and postseason tournaments infringing on class attendance. Id.
241
See Lynch, supra note 151, at 604. The unfortunate truth is that often the choice has to
be athletics, because, if athletes refuse to meet their coaches’ demanding requirements, they will lose
their athletic scholarships. SPERBER, supra note 161, at 303.
242
According to Bowen and Levin, recruitment of athletes in the high-profile sports “has
become so aggressive that not even lip service is paid to educational values.” BOWEN & LEVIN,
supra note 158, at 44.
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The Supreme Court has provided some guidance for determining
whether a restriction is necessary for an employer to operate efficiently
and effectively. According to the Court, relevant considerations in this
test include whether the employee speech “impairs discipline by
supervisors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact
on . . . working relationships, . . . or interferes with the regular operation
of the enterprise.”243 Because the instant situation is not the traditional
employer-employee relationship, the only applicable inquiry seems to be
whether the harms of recruiting speech interfere with the regular
operation of the NCAA.
Indeed, recruiting harms have impeded the regular operation of
the NCAA and, consequently, detracted from its ability to operate
efficiently and effectively. Among the NCAA’s stated purposes are:
protecting the well-being of student-athletes, ensuring fair and equitable
competition, and respecting the supporting role that athletics plays to
education.244 Part of the NCAA’s regular operation includes enacting
measures to ensure these purposes are upheld.245 Nonetheless, recruiting
has lead directly to exploitation of student-athletes, unequal competition,
and diminishment of the educational predominance, each of which
strikes at the core of the NCAA’s purposes. In undermining the NCAA’s
values, recruiting interferes with its regular operation and detracts from
its ability to operate efficiently and effectively.246
The negative impact of recruiting on the NCAA’s efficient and
effective operation can be seen in the failures of the NCAA’s current
enforcement system. To uphold its rules, the NCAA has an enforcement
division that investigates and punishes rules violations.247 However, the
high number of recruiting and other violations248 has significantly
negated the enforcement division’s ability to quash this conduct. Because

243

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987); see also Love-Lane v. Martin, 355
F.3d 766, 778 (4th Cir. 2004); Khauns v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (7th Cir. 1997).
244
See supra notes 129, 131-133 and accompanying text.
245
NCAA, Services, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1355 (last visited Jan. 3,
2009) (stating that part of its job is to enact regulations to deal with athletic problems).
246
Cf. Hinshaw v. Smith, 436 F.3d 997, 1007-08 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that speech
which miscommunicated the employer’s interpretation of a recently-passed law undermined the
board’s efforts and was thus unprotected under Pickering); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 149
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a police officer’s speech, reinforcing perception that police department
is racially biased, undermined the efforts of the police department and thus impaired its ability to
operate efficiently).
247
NCAA, NCAA Enforcement/Infractions, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=
34874 (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
248
For the number of rules violations in recent years, see Wolverton, supra note 4.
Notably, those numbers include only detected violations; a substantial amount of violations go
undetected. See infra notes 253-254 and accompanying text.
Significantly, out of all areas of NCAA rules violations—i.e., academic, recruiting,
eligibility, unethical conduct, illegal participation—half occur from recruiting. SPERBER, supra note
161, at 245.
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of the NCAA’s small enforcement division,249 it relies heavily on the
college or university to investigate itself in many cases.250 This tactic is
obviously suspect given an institution’s desire to act in its own selfinterest. Consequently, the NCAA has increased its efforts to limit
infractions.251 However, this strategy has produced mixed results. While
there is speculation that these efforts have curtailed NCAA violations,252
the fact remains that many violations still go undetected.253 For example,
the NCAA staff, which receives seven or eight tips a day concerning
possible rules violations, still pursues only one of every fifteen leads.254
Because the NCAA has to rely so heavily on the individual
institutions to report violations, it has encouraged schools to cooperate
with its enforcement division in exchange for a reduction in penalties.255
As a result, the penalties the NCAA has implemented to enforce
violations have been relatively weak.256 The most common penalties for
major violations of NCAA rules are the loss of scholarships, a limitation
on the number of recruiting visits, and probation.257 These penalties have
little effect on the coaches and schools that receive them.258
Thus, the NCAA’s enforcement efforts have created a system in
which (1) an overwhelming majority of violations go undetected and (2)
249

See Lynch, supra note 151, at 612 (“[T]he small size of the NCAA’s enforcement staff
impairs its ability to detect violations of those rules.”). While the NCAA has increased its
enforcement efforts, see Wolverton, supra note 4 (“The NCAA has doubled its investigative staff in
recent years and cut its average inquiry time in half, to about 10 months.”), the NCAA still
contributes only .99% of its budget to enforcement. NCAA Revised Budget, supra note 150.
250
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 174.
251
See supra note 249.
252
See Wolverton, supra note 4.
253
See id.; ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 174 (“[T]he NCAA does not have the resources
to investigate even 1 percent of the major infractions.”); Dan Wetzel, NCAA Naps During Golden
Age of Cheating, RIVALS.COM, Sept. 24, 2008, http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news;_ylt=Al9c
AynbXuRDOAXO_GKxqyw5nYcB?slug=dw-ncaacheating092308&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (noting
that recently the NCAA has not pursued violations of its rules with much fervor, leading to a golden
age of cheating in college athletics).
254
Wolverton, supra note 4. A good reason for this may be the fact that the enforcement
division has only twenty investigators to investigate almost 17,000 teams. NCAA, SUMMARY OF
NCAA SPORTS SPONSORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION RATES DATA RELATED TO THE DECLINE IN THE
SPONSORSHIP OF OLYMPIC SPORTS 12 (2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/resources/
file/ebee0945173e990/olympic_sports_supplement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&attachment=true.
255
SPERBER, supra note 161, at 317.
256
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 177-78 (“If a violation is detected . . . the penalty
ultimately imposed is de minimis and getting smaller.”). For a recent example, see the weak penalties
imposed by the NCAA against Indiana University and its head coach, Kelvin Sampson, for
committing various recruiting violations. See Andy Katz, Sampson Receives NCAA’s Harshest
Penalty, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=3725832 (last visited May 18,
2009). Most indicative of how weak the penalties are is that all the coaches on the then-Indiana
University staff are currently coaching at the professional or collegiate level. Id.
257
See Lynch, supra note 151, at 612; Katz, supra note 256.
258
For coaches, see ZIMBALIST supra note 150, at 177 (describing how, despite engaging
in numerous recruiting violations from 1995-96, UCLA Coach Jim Harrick received no penalty from
the NCAA and was coaching at a different school a year after the violations were uncovered). For
schools, see Mahoney, Fink & Pastore, supra note 5, at 452 (citing statistics which show that NCAA
penalties did not significantly impact team records); ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 179 (claiming
that during the 1980s and 1990s “it paid to cheat”). For both, see Katz, supra note 256.
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those that are detected result in rather minimal penalties. For an
association committed to detecting and punishing violations in order to
prevent unwanted conduct, undoubtedly this system is inefficient and
ineffective. By fostering such a system, recruiting is directly responsible
for the ineffective and inefficient operation of the NCAA.
Fortunately, an NCAA recruiting ban discourages the recruiting
harms that cause this inefficiency. In Brentwood II, the Court accepted,
without inquiry, that the TSSAA’s Anti-Recruiting Rule discouraged the
harms of recruiting.259 Logically, it does not seem as though inquiry is
necessary since a rule that bans recruiting is naturally going to
discourage the harms that result from it.260 Moreover, a recruiting ban
would serve much better than the current framework, which is a
complicated and extensive set of rules that contain loopholes that allow
for easy evasion of the NCAA’s recruiting restrictions.261 An all-out ban
would not allow any room for interpretation, preventing coaches from
engaging in legal but ethically questionable conduct.
Ultimately, recruiting and the harms that result from it prevent
the NCAA from the efficient and effective implementation of its
purposes. To discourage these hindrances and increase the likelihood of
an efficient and effective NCAA, a recruiting ban, and not merely
stronger recruiting rules, is necessary. Consequently, a recruiting ban
would survive the Pickering balancing test, the final prong of the
Pickering doctrine.
IV.

WHAT’S NEXT?: PASSING A RECRUITING BAN

While the NCAA may have the ability, legally, to pass a
recruiting ban, whether the NCAA would be willing to impose such a
ban is an entirely different question. Indeed, the NCAA should pass a
recruiting ban. Recruiting student-athletes has undermined not only the
purpose of the NCAA, but also of college sports in general. Colleges and
universities’ primary purpose is educating its students.262 Sports are
supposed to play a supporting role to academics and supplement the
institution’s mission.263 Thus, while athletics certainly serves a purpose in
the educational mission of an institution, its position is firmly inferior to
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Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
2489, 2496 (2007).
260
Of course, an argument could be that a recruiting ban will have no effect because even
if the NCAA passed a recruiting ban, exploitation, unequal competition, and the primacy of athletics
would still continue. However, merely because such conduct might continue to occur does not mean
that a recruiting ban does not discourage it.
261
See O’Neil, supra note 12.
262
According to the University of Connecticut’s Athletic Department, “[i]ntellectual
growth and academic progress is the primary purpose for [the student-athlete] being [in college].”
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT DIVISION OF ATHLETICS, supra note 6.
263
Id.
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education. For all the reasons discussed in Part III, recruiting crosses this
line, and therefore should be banned.
Moreover, the disadvantages of a recruiting ban are minimal.
Banning recruiting does not have a harmful impact on prospective
student-athletes.264 A recruiting ban need not affect generally qualified
and physically gifted student-athletes who wish to use their athletic
abilities to gain admission.265 Coaches would still know who to support in
this process since a recruiting ban would not restrict unilateral action by
the student, such as sending video of themselves to coaches.266 The
student would still be able to access the necessary information in order to
make an informed decision about the institution he or she wishes to
attend.267 Finally, it would not harmfully impact the student-athlete’s
ability to play an intercollegiate sport.268
The only real negative impact of a recruiting rule is on the
schools that will be unable to attract highly touted high school athletes
through recruiting. However, if schools were committed to their mission
of educational primacy, this would not be a negative at all. Athletic
success, while desired, is not critical to achieving the educational goals
of athletics.269
264

It may have an impact on those high schoolers with professional aspirations who want
to be at the best program to succeed athletically; however, college is an educational institution, not a
professional minor league.
265
Colleges have special admissions procedures in which they give beneficial treatment
to student-athletes who may not otherwise be admitted but whose athletic abilities will enrich the
student body. Deirdre Carmody, Colleges Bend Admissions for More than Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1989, at B6. This treatment also accrues to musicians, artists, and others who would benefit the
student body. Id. While these applicants may be not be the best qualified, they are nonetheless still
qualified to attend the institution according to the institution’s, and not NCAA minimum, standards.
See id. So long as this procedure is used to admit under-qualified, but not unqualified, studentathletes, there is little problem with it. Of course, this process would have to be regulated to ensure
that it is not abused. See Elliott Almond, Athletes Go to the Front of Admission Line, L.A. TIMES,
May 3, 1991, at C1 (discussing how the special admissions process is used to get admission of
unqualified athletes).
266
See supra note 19.
267
A recruiting ban in no way prevents a school from generally advertising their athletic
programs. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood II), 127 S. Ct.
2489, 2495 (2007). Moreover, given the popularity of college athletics and the easy access to
information via the Internet, it is likely that a prospective student-athlete would be able to gain
substantial information about a school’s athletic program without having to talk to the coach.
Importantly, with the elimination of recruiting, the emphasis of this decision would hopefully be on
academics rather than on athletics since, without communicating with the coach, a student-athlete
would not be certain whether he or she could participate in athletics at the school.
268
Certainly, without recruiting there is a chance that schools will admit too many
athletes, such that some will not be able to make a team. However, this does not mean a studentathlete will never play sports. Schools have intramural sports, see, e.g., Univ. of Mich., Intramural
Sports Homepage, http://www.recsports.umich.edu/intramurals/ (last visited, Jan. 3, 2009), and
students are permitted to transfer. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at art. 14.5. In
fact, without recruiting, the opportunity to play intercollegiate sports may increase because the
stigma of the “walk-on” will be eliminated. See SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 170, at 39 (odds of
making a team without knowing coach are “essentially zero”).
269
See Univ. of Mich. Athletic Dep’t, Mission Statement, supra note 149. In fact, less
focus on athletic success could improve a school’s academic programs. While athletic success can
bring substantial revenue to a university, most universities, even those with successful athletic
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Unfortunately, many schools are not committed to educational
primacy because college athletics is such a lucrative business.270 As
discussed earlier in this Note, schools receive a great deal of money from
their athletic programs,271 the amount of which is integrally tied to their
athletic success.272 By jeopardizing the ability to obtain premiere
prospects, a recruiting ban has the potential to cripple an athletic
program’s success, and, consequently, cut the amount of revenue a
school receives.273 With the possibility of losing a substantial amount of
revenue, the schools comprising the NCAA would likely not support a
recruiting ban.274
Moreover, the NCAA, as an entity separate and distinct from the
member schools, would have little incentive to support such a ban.
College athletics has likewise generated a substantial amount of
operating revenue for the NCAA.275 Unfortunately, the NCAA’s financial
success has come while undermining its own principles.276 Therefore,
while supporting a recruiting ban would help the NCAA uphold its
values, it would also undermine the importance of athletics and
potentially uproot the financial base of the NCAA. As the NCAA’s
record has shown, if such a choice presented itself the NCAA would
likely opt for maintaining the status quo.277
Thus, while the NCAA seems to have the legal endorsement to
pass a recruiting ban, it is unlikely that the NCAA would be willing to
pass one. As a result, it may be necessary for reform to come from a
higher power. Since its formation in 1905,278 the NCAA has largely
governed itself; Congress has usually refused to take part in any reform
efforts.279 However, in extreme circumstances, the government has

programs, lose money from their athletic programs. See supra note 150; see also MURRAY
SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: HOW BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS IS CRIPPLING
UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 219-22 (2000). To remedy this, every year, schools use their
additional financial resources to “zero out” the athletic department’s books. SPERBER, supra, at 221.
As a result, “[m]oney that could go to academic programs, student scholarships and loans, and many
other educational purposes annually disappears down the athletic department financial hole.” Id.
270
See Lynch, supra note 151, at 605-07 (discussing how schools have allowed their
educational missions to be infringed upon in order to maximize revenue from athletics).
271
See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
272
See supra note 153.
273
See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
274
See Lynch, supra note 151, at 605-08. This is critical because the persons that
introduce and vote on rules are volunteers from the NCAA’s member institutions. NCAA, Overview,
supra note 102.
275
The NCAA’s current operating revenue is $614 million. See supra note 150.
276
See Wetzel, supra note 253 (arguing that the NCAA has forfeited extensive
enforcement in order to protect its big-time programs and television money).
277
Id.
278
See NCAA, The History of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1354
(last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
279
ZIMBALIST, supra note 150, at 195-96; Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12-21 (2000).
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stepped in, pressuring the NCAA to make changes.280 For example, in
1978, the United States House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation held hearings to investigate the NCAA’s
enforcement processes amidst public criticism that the processes were
unfair.281 Subsequently, the NCAA altered its rules to better address the
concerns discussed in these hearings.282
According to some commentators, the current trend of the
NCAA towards the commercialism of college sports is a call for
government intervention.283 Moreover, Congress itself has recognized a
need to protect student-athletes from harmful collegiate recruiting. After
the Colorado University recruiting scandal in 2004, Congress held a
hearing on whether student-athletes were being protected in the
recruiting process.284 Hopefully, the NCAA’s current subjugation of
academic values and exploitation of student-athletes through the
recruiting process will inspire further government action, giving the
NCAA the necessary motivation to pass a recruiting ban.285
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of colleges and universities is to educate. College
athletics is supposed to play a supporting role in this purpose by fostering
leadership, physical fitness, and athletic excellence in an effort to
enhance the educational experience.286 Unfortunately, for a variety of
reasons, many have forgotten the professed athletic-academic
relationship. Nowhere is this loss more evident than in recruiting. Driven
by the desire for academic success, recruiting has become a corrupt
process that exposes high school student-athletes to inappropriate
situations, exploits the student-athletes, and sacrifices academic success
for athletic excellence.
Fortunately, Brentwood II provides the NCAA with an
opportunity to reestablish the proper role of college athletics. In finding
that a high school athletic association can limit the speech of its member
institutions and their coaches, the Court provides a template for a college
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Smith, supra note 279, at 16.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 22 (“If the NCAA and those who lead at the institutional and conference levels
are unable to maintain academic values in the face of economics and related pressures, the
government may be less than a proverbial step away.”).
284
College Recruiting: Are Student Athletes Being Protected: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004).
285
Notably though, given the importance of college athletics in popular culture,
commentators speculate that such a drastic reform may not be realistic. See ZIMBALIST, supra note
150, at 196.
286
Id.; NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 11, at art. 1.2.
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athletic association to do the same. Hopefully the NCAA, whether
pressured or not, will act on this endorsement and ban athletic recruiting.
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